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511 
CROSSED WIRES: OUTDATED PERCEPTIONS OF 
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN THE 
NLRB’S PURPLE COMMUNICATIONS DECISION  
INTRODUCTION 
The National Labor Relations Board (the NLRB or the Board) has 
recently emphasized the need to adjust to the rapid pace of change in 
modern society.
1
 The recognition of employees’ right to use employer-
owned email systems for protected activities in its December 2014 Purple 
Communications decision purported to establish a central pillar of this 
effort.
2
 Purple Communications reversed the NLRB’s 2007 Register 
Guard holding that employees do not have the right to use employer-
owned electronic resources for protected activities.
3
 However, the Board’s 
rationale in Purple Communications reflected an understanding of 
electronic resources that was more suited to 2007 than to the lives of 
workers in late 2014. Consequently, an attempt to demonstrate adaptability 
resulted in a failure to respond to changed circumstances. 
Part I of this Note describes the NLRB’s role in protecting collective 
action in the workplace, as well as its responsibility to adapt its standards 
to changing social, economic, and technological circumstances. Part II 
explains that the tension between employees’ collective action rights and 
employers’ property rights represents one of the fundamental balancing 
acts the Board must perform as circumstances change. Next, Part III 
examines how the Board has performed that balancing act in the context of 
email, including its 2007 Register Guard and 2014 Purple 
Communications decisions. Part IV demonstrates that workers’ utilizations 
of diverse electronic communications platforms grew significantly 
between 2007 and 2014. Part V argues that those changes should have 
factored into the Board’s analysis in Purple Communications.   
 
 
 1. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc. (BFI Newby Island Recyclery), 362 N.L.R.B. 
No. 186, at 11 (Aug. 27, 2015) (“[T]he primary function and responsibility of the Board . . . is that ‘of 
applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life.’ If the [Board’s 
standards fail to adjust to changing circumstances,] the Board is failing in what the Supreme Court has 
described as the Board’s ‘responsibility to adapt the Act to the changing patterns of industrial life.’” 
(first citing Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 496 (1979); and then citing NLRB v. J. 
Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975)) (internal citations omitted). 
 2. Purple Commc’ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126 (2014).  
 3. The Guard Publ’g Co. (Register Guard), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110 (2007), enforced in relevant part 
and remanded sub nom. Guard Publ’g v. NLRB, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
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I. THE ROLE OF THE NLRB IN CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES 
A. Interpretation and Enforcement of the National Labor Relations Act 
The National Labor Relations Act (the “Act”) established the bedrock 
of national labor policy when President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed it 
into law on July 5, 1935.
4
 Congress’s primary goal when it enacted the Act 
was to encourage unionization and collective bargaining.
5
 Sections 7 and 8 
of the Act protect employees engaged in union activities from employer 
retaliation.
6
 These two Sections also protect group actions by employees 
aimed at changing or protesting their terms and conditions of employment, 
even if no union organizing drive has been contemplated.
7
  
The Act vests responsibility for application and enforcement of its 
mandates with the NLRB.
8
 The Board’s jurisdiction extends to all private-
sector employers affecting interstate commerce.
9
 It performs a unique 
“quasi-judicial” (administrative and judicial) function to resolve unfair 
labor practice allegations.
10
 A presidentially appointed
11
 General Counsel 
investigates unfair labor practice charges filed by employees, labor 
organizations, and employers through its Regional Offices.
12
 The General 
Counsel then assumes an advocacy role and issues a complaint if it is 
determined that a charge has merit.
13
 Prosecution of the complaint initially 
occurs before an administrative law judge, whose decision is then 
 
 
 4. Who We Are: The 1935 Passage of the Wagner Act, NLRB.GOV (Oct. 25, 2015, 9:34 AM), 
https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/our-history/1935-passage-wagner-act [https://perma.cc/HYW4-ZZGL]. 
 5. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (“It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to . . . 
encourag[e] the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and [to] protect[] the exercise by 
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their 
own choosing . . . .”). 
 6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3) (2012). 
 7. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). See NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983, 988 (7th Cir. 
1948) (“A proper construction [of Section 7] is that the employees shall have the right to engage in 
concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection even though no union activity be involved, or 
collective bargaining be contemplated.”); see also Charles J. Morris, NLRB Protection In the 
Nonunion Workplace: A Glimpse at a General Theory of Section 7 Conduct, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1673, 
1701 (1989).   
 8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153–55. 
 9. Id. § 152(2) (defining “employer”); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 
(1937). An employer’s activity in interstate commerce must be more than de minimis for the Board to 
exercise jurisdiction over it. See, e.g., Somerset Manor Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 1647 (1968); W. Carter 
Maxwell, 241 N.L.R.B. 264 (1979).  
 10. Oklahoma Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 212 n.51 (1946); Truserv Corp., 349 
N.L.R.B. 227, 237 n.13 (2007); 51 C.J.S. Labor Relations § 692 (2015).  
 11. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d). 
 12.  Id. § 153(b); What We Do: Investigate Charges, NLRB.GOV (last visited Oct. 25, 2015, 
12:29 PM), https://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/investigate-charges [https://perma.cc/8GQH-ARJQ]. 
 13. What We Do: Investigate Charges, supra note 12.   
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p 511 Kuntz book pages.docx2/14/2017  
 
 
 
 
 
2016] CROSSED WIRES 513 
 
 
 
 
reviewable by the five-member Board.
14
 The federal courts of appeals 
have jurisdiction to review Board decisions.
15
 
The President appoints Board members with advice and consent from 
the Senate.
16
 Traditionally, the President appoints three Board members 
from the President’s political party and two members from the opposing 
party.
17 
Board members typically vote in accordance with the labor or 
management preferences of their political party.
18
 As a result, Board 
standards often oscillate between pro-labor and pro-management positions 
as the White House changes hands.
19
  
B. NLRB Responsiveness to Changing Circumstances 
The Board has unquestionably faced an evolving landscape over time. 
Passage of the Act was motivated by the unique circumstances of the 
Great Depression and the massive worker dislocation that it caused.
20
 The 
statutory language reflects the unique nature of that tumultuous period in 
 
 
 14. 29 C.F.R. § 101.11(b) (2015); What We Do: Decide Cases, NLRB.GOV (last visited Oct. 25, 
2015, 12:32 PM), https://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/decide-cases [https://perma.cc/5AJG-HC8R]. 
 15. What We Do: Decide Cases, supra note 14. A party may request review of a Board decision 
from either a court of appeals for the jurisdiction in which it resides or transacts business, or from the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f). Practically speaking, the 
multiplicity of parties’ court of appeals review options means that Board and Supreme Court decisions 
are the only mandatory authority in charge investigations, administrative law judge decisions, and 
Board adjudications. Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 615, 616 (1963). 
 16. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a). 
 17. WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, LABORED RELATIONS: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE NLRB—A MEMOIR 
15 (2000); Ronald Turner, Ideological Voting on the National Labor Relations Board, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. 
& EMP. L. 707, 714 (2006). 
 18. See William N. Cooke et al., The Determinants of NLRB Decision-Making Revisited, 48 
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 237, 241 (1995); William N. Cooke & Frederick H. Gautschi III, Political 
Bias in NLRB Unfair Labor Practice Decisions, 35 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 539, 549 (1982). 
 19. Turner, supra note 17, at 717–51 (describing thirteen areas in which Board standards have 
been modified at least once as a result of changes in the political composition of the Board); Samuel 
Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 163, 
171 (1985) (“[A]brupt changes in policy appear[] to rework in wholesale major areas of Board law, 
[and are] often undone three or four years later . . . .”).  
 20. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 42 (1937) (upholding the 
constitutionality of the Act and stating: “Refusal to confer and negotiate has been one of the most 
prolific causes of strife. This is such an outstanding fact in the history of labor disturbances that it is a 
proper subject of judicial notice and requires no citation of instances.”); Fafnir Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 
362 F.2d 716, 717 (2d Cir. 1966) (noting that the Act was “conceived during the Great Depression and 
founded upon a frank recognition that our boom-and-bust economy was attributable in part to labor-
management unrest”); see also Brandon C. Janes, The Illusion of Permanency for Mackay Doctrine 
Replacement Workers, 54 TEX. L. REV. 126, 127 (1975) (observing that the Act was “part of the great 
economic reconstruction during the depression of the 1930’s”). 
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American history.
21
 However, the social, economic, and technological 
circumstances of that time differ vastly from the dynamic characteristics of 
the modern economy.
22
 
Perhaps the most noteworthy change in recent decades from the 
perspectives of labor, management, and the Board alike has been the 
precipitous decline in union membership. Private sector union density 
peaked at an estimated 35% to 37% in the mid-1950s.
23
 That figure 
declined to 20.1% by 1983,
24
 and reached 6.9% in 2010.
25
 The Bureau of 
Labor Statistics’ most recent studies place the current figure at just 6.7%.26  
Many supporters of the labor movement believe that unfavorable 
NLRB standards, particularly during the George W. Bush administration, 
have been partially responsible for the decline of unionization.
27
 A 
common narrative of such criticisms has developed, categorizing pro-
management outcomes as evidence that the agency is “largely irrelevant to 
the contemporary workplace,”28 “ossified,”29 dead on arrival,30 and, 
 
 
 21.  See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 151 (“The inequality of bargaining power . . . tends to aggravate 
recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in 
industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within 
and between industries.”). 
 22. Wilma B. Liebman, Decline and Disenchantment: Reflections on the Aging of the National 
Labor Relations Board, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 569, 576 (2007) (“American labor law, 
enacted when the prototypical workplace was the factory, and the rotary telephone was ‘the last word 
in desktop technology,’ increasingly appears out of sync with changing workplace realities.” (quoting 
Michael J. McCarthy, Sympathetic Ear: Your Manager’s Policy On Employees’ E-Mail May Have a 
Weak Spot—Labor Board Takes On Rules That Restrict Discussion Of Workplace Concerns—
Vindicated, but ‘Gun-Shy’, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2000, at A1)). 
 23. David Broderdorf, Overcoming the First Contract Hurdle: Finding a Role for Mandatory 
Interest Arbitration in the Private Sector, 23 LAB. L. 323, 324 (2008).  
 24. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members in 2006 (Jan. 25, 2007), 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01252007.pdf [https://perma.cc/3N4V-2YWG]. 
 25. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members—2010 (Jan. 21, 2011), 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01212011.pdf [https://perma.cc/LQ3Z-E9PT]. 
 26. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members—2015 (Jan. 28, 2016), 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm [https://perma.cc/XWE3-SRXM]. 
 27. See Liebman, supra note 22, at 579–88; James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The 
NLRB’s Uncertain Future, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 221, 248–55 (2005); Catherine L. Fisk & 
Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems with Its Structure and 
Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2020–43 (2009). However, it should be 
noted that few, if any, scholars have claimed that the decline in unionization has been exclusively due 
to Board jurisprudence. Failures by the labor movement itself, statutory limitations, and unfavorable 
Supreme Court decisions, among other factors, are often viewed as imposing equally, if not more, 
significant constraints on labor. See Liebman, supra note 22, at 576–80; Brudney, supra, at 227–34; 
Fisk & Malamud, supra, at 2044–53. 
 28. James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining Protections and the Statutory 
Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 939, 942 (1996). 
 29. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 
1530 (2002). 
 30.  Harry Sangerman, NLRB: DOA?, 33 EMP. REL. L.J. 74, 78 (2007). 
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generally, obsolete.
31
 Labor advocates, in sum, viewed the Bush Board as 
unresponsive to changing circumstances.
32
 This criticism specifically 
targeted perceived unresponsiveness to the growth of technology in the 
workplace.
33
  
However, many observers have conflated adaptability to changing 
circumstances with political decision-making by the Board.
34
 This 
difficulty is amplified by the Board’s frequent reliance, throughout its 
history, on purportedly new circumstances to arrive at conclusions that 
many view as politically motivated.
35
 Accordingly, acknowledgment of 
the need to adapt to changing circumstances has not been limited to 
Boards controlled by the Democratic Party.
36
 
Nonetheless, the Board under the Obama administration has robustly 
responded to adaptability criticisms, particularly those regarding its 
approach to technology.
37
 The Board has held during the Obama 
 
 
 31. See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet Kill the NLRA?, 76 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 262, 263 (2008).  
 32. See id. at 282–85; Liebman, supra note 22, at 579; Fisk & Malamud, supra note 27, at 2068–
77. 
 33. Nora L. Macey, Proposals to Reinstate the Voluntary Recognition Bar and Rein in Captive 
Audience Speeches: A Rationale for Change at the National Labor Relations Board, 87 IND. L.J. 177, 
179 (2012) (asserting that “[c]hanges in technology, particularly in how work gets done and in how 
employers and workers communicate, are making old ways of thinking about labor management issues 
obsolete”); see also Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The National Labor Relations Act in 
Cyberspace: Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2000); Hirsch, supra 
note 31. 
 34. See Brudney, supra note 27, at 226 (“The Board’s recent performance has elicited sharp 
disapproval from legal academics as well as unions. Far from rendering the Act as effective as possible 
in modern circumstances . . . the Board has undermined a range of employee protections . . . .”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 35. The Board’s recent decision on the standard for joint employer status in Browning-Ferris 
Indus. of Cal., Inc. (BFI Newby Island Recyclery), 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 (Aug. 27, 2015), provides 
one such example. The decision emphasized adaptation to changing circumstances as a major reason 
for an outcome that facilitates union organizing efforts. Id. at 11. However, management proponents 
complained that the decision was “a case study in unaccountable government.” NLRB’s Joint 
Employer Attack: The Obama Labor Board Attacks the Franchise Business Model, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 
28, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/nlrbs-joint-employer-attack-1440805826. Meanwhile, labor 
advocates were “sparked” by the decision because “it create[d] an incentive for workers to realize they 
have power.” Shan Li, On the Record: UCLA’s Victor Narro Explains NLRB ‘Joint Employer’ Ruling, 
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-qa-nlrb-20150903-story.html. See 
also Fisk & Malamud, supra note 27, at 2043–44 (arguing that changes in circumstances cannot be 
separated from ideology). 
 36. See, e.g., IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1291 (2004) (pointing to “ever-increasing 
requirements” for employers to conduct discrimination and sexual harassment investigations, increases 
in workplace violence, and the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to support a 
holding that nonunion workers have no statutory right to representation in investigatory interviews that 
may result in discipline). 
 37. Timothy Noah & Brian Mahoney, Obama Labor Board Flexes Its Muscles, POLITICO (Sept. 
1, 2015, 12:27 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/09/unions-barack-obama-labor-board-victories-
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administration that employers may not retaliate against employees for 
union and other protected activities that occur on social media platforms.
38
 
It issued changes to its Rules and Regulations for union representation 
elections that rely heavily on email and E-Filing, including a new 
requirement that employers provide employees’ personal and work email 
addresses to any union that petitions to represent them.
39
 The Board and 
General Counsel have also announced that electronic signatures are now 
acceptable for showings of interest in support of representation petitions.
40
 
The Board has even attempted to bolster its public outreach efforts through 
the launch of a mobile app.
41
  
II. THE TENSION BETWEEN PROPERTY RIGHTS AND SECTION 7 
While the debate over utilization of employer-owned electronic 
systems and devices for protected activities presents novel issues, the 
underlying tension between employees’ Section 7 rights and employers’ 
property rights is as old as the Act itself.
42
 The Supreme Court has 
commented that the balance of employers’ property interests and 
employees’ Section 7 rights “must be obtained with as little destruction of 
one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other.”43 Questions of 
how, when, and where employees must be permitted to engage in 
protected activities at the workplace often implicate these competing 
interests. The utilization of employers’ communications systems for 
 
 
213204 [https://perma.cc/9SVN-45MV] (“‘As a management-side lawyer for 40 years,’ said Michael 
Lotito of the law firm Littler Mendelson, ‘I certainly have not seen such an activist board as this one 
on behalf of labor. Nothing close.’ Larry Cohen, who recently stepped down as president of the 
Communications Workers of America, doesn’t necessarily disagree. ‘The quality of this board is the 
best ever,’ he said. ‘The NLRB appointments is one place where President Obama would get a perfect 
score.’”). 
 38. Three D, LLC, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 31 (2014); Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. 
368 (2012). 
 39. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 102.60–63 (2015) (new requirements), with Trustees of Columbia 
Univ., 350 N.L.R.B. 574 (2007) (holding petitioning union not entitled to employee email addresses, 
even though employees were isolated on research ship at sea). 
 40. Memorandum from Richard F. Griffin, NLRB Gen. Counsel, to All Regional Dirs., Officers-
in-Charge, & Resident Officers (Sept. 1, 2015). 
 41. Press Release, NLRB, National Labor Relations Board Launches Mobile App (Aug. 30, 
2013), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/national-labor-relations-board-launches-mobile-
app [https://perma.cc/DL99-MDMX]. 
 42. Congress recognized this tension in the text of the Act. Employees’ Section 7 rights are 
protected under Section 8(a)(1)’s prohibition on employer actions that “interfere with, restrain, or 
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [S]ection 7.” 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1) (2012). 
In 1947, Congress amended the Act to also protect employers’ rights to use their property for their 
own free speech in Section 8(c). Id. § 158(c). 
 43. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss2/9
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protected purposes implicates all three contextual questions, requiring a 
different balance. 
A. The Nature of Protected Activities 
Employers often advance at least one of two arguments claiming that 
purportedly protected activities were, in fact, unprotected. First, an 
employer may argue that the employee’s conduct was individualized in 
nature, and thus not “concerted.”44 While concerted activities regarding 
terms and conditions of employment enjoy the Act’s protection due to the 
policy concerns underlying Section 7, individualized complaints do not 
provide any justification for encroachment upon the employer’s property 
interests.
45
 
Second, an employer may characterize such activities as unprotected 
misconduct because otherwise protected activities often run directly 
contrary to the employer’s business interests.46 Very serious misconduct, 
though otherwise protected, may so heavily burden the employer’s 
property rights as to lose the protection of the Act.
47
  
B. The Time for Protected Activities 
Long-standing Board precedent has maintained the maxim that 
“working time is for work.”48 The term “working time” is critical because 
 
 
 44. 29 U.S.C. § 157. The Board’s test for concert is whether the activity is “engaged in with or 
on the authority of other employees, and not solely by and on behalf of the employee himself.” Meyers 
Indus., 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 885 (1986) (Meyers II) (internal quotations omitted), aff’d sub nom. Prill v. 
NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  
 45. See, e.g., Tampa Tribune, 346 N.L.R.B. 369, 371–72 (2006) (employee’s complaints about 
favoritism not concerted because the employee “was speaking only for himself”); Mushroom Transp. 
Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 684–85 (3d Cir. 1964) (finding, despite employee’s repeated 
conversations with co-workers regarding holiday pay, vacations, and assignment practices, no 
evidence that such conversations “involved any effort on his or their part to initiate or promote any 
concerted action to do anything about [those matters]”); see also Morris, supra note 7, at 1684–86.  
 46. See, e.g., University Medical Center, 335 N.L.R.B. 1318, 1320–21 (2001) (rule prohibiting 
“[i]nsubordination, refusing to follow directions, obey legitimate requests or orders, or other 
disrespectful conduct towards a service integrator, service coordinator, or other individual” found 
unlawful because such conduct could include “vigorous proselytizing for or against a union”), 
enforcement denied in relevant part sub nom. Cmty. Hosp.s of Cent. Cal. v. NLRB, 335 F.3d 1079 
(D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 47. Compare Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 249 (1997) (“[The Employer], like any 
other employer, wants a friction free working environment. But . . . Section 7 activity may acceptably 
be accompanied by some impropriety.”), with Piper Realty Co., 313 N.L.R.B. 1289, 1290 (1994) 
(“[A]lthough employees are permitted some leeway for impulsive behavior when engaging in 
concerted activity, this leeway is balanced against an employer’s right to maintain order and respect.”). 
 48. Our Way, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 394 (1983) (quoting Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 
(1943)). 
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“that term connotes periods when employees are performing actual job 
duties, periods which do not include the employees’ own time such as 
lunch and break periods.”49 Therefore, employers’ rules against, and 
discipline for, employees engaging in protected activities (such as 
distributing union literature) during working time are presumptively 
valid.
50
 However, employees may not be prohibited from engaging in 
protected activities during their own time, including breaks and lunches, 
because that time does not implicate employers’ property rights.51 
C. The Place for Protected Activities 
The Supreme Court recognized the Board’s authority to disallow 
employer prohibitions on protected activities in certain areas of its 
property in the seminal Republic Aviation case.
52
 The Court identified the 
fundamental tension between employees’ Section 7 rights and employers’ 
property rights as an important reason for deciding the case.
53
 One of the 
issues, a prohibition on distribution related to concerns about littering and 
thefts from automobiles, prompted the Court to quote the Board’s 
balancing of interests with approval.
54
 
The distinction between working areas, where employers may 
generally prohibit Section 7 activities, and non-working areas has been 
one of the most important applications of Republic Aviation.
55
 An 
 
 
 49. Id. at 395. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See id.; Peyton Packing, 249 N.L.R.B. at 843–44; see also Nations Rent, Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 
179, 186 (2004); Aluminum Casting & Eng’g Co., 328 N.L.R.B. 8, 9 (1999). 
 52. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). 
 53. Id. at 797–98 (“These cases bring here for review the action of the National Labor Relations 
Board in working out an adjustment between the undisputed right of self-organization assured to 
employees under the [NLRA] and the equally undisputed right of employers to maintain discipline in 
their establishments. Like so many others, these rights are not unlimited in the sense that they can be 
exercised without regard to any duty which the existence of rights in others may place upon employer 
or employee. Opportunity to organize and proper discipline are both essential elements in a balanced 
society.”). 
 54. Id. at 802 n.8 (allowing that “[i]nconvenience, or even some dislocation of property rights, 
may be necessary in order to safeguard the right to collective bargaining” (quoting LeTourneau Co. of 
Ga., 54 N.L.R.B. 1259, 1260 (1944))). LeTourneau was consolidated with Republic Aviation before 
the Supreme Court. Id. at 797. 
 55. The Board first explicitly drew this distinction in Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 
615 (1962). There, the Board emphasized its reliance on the Supreme Court’s balancing of interests in 
Republic Aviation. Id. at 616–17. It applied a common sense balancing approach, noting the ability of 
employees to engage in protected activities “at company parking lots, at plant entrances or exits, or in 
other nonworking areas.” Id. at 620; see also McBride’s of Naylor Road, 229 N.L.R.B. 795, 795–96 
(1977). Particularized standards have developed for various industries, such as distinctions between 
patient care and non-patient care areas in healthcare facilities. See, e.g., Intercommunity Hosp., 255 
N.L.R.B. 468, 471 (1981); St. John’s Hosp. & Sch. of Nursing, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 1150, 1150 (1976), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss2/9
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employer must demonstrate special circumstances in order to prohibit 
Section 7 activities in non-working areas.
56
  
The Court’s approval of interest balancing in Republic Aviation 
provided a basis for subsequent similar decisions regarding the place for 
protected activities. The Court again balanced interests when it held, forty-
five years later, that the Board may not compel employers to grant 
nonemployee union organizers access to employer-owned property unless 
“no reasonable means short of trespass” exist for organizers to reach the 
employees.
57
  
D. Protected Activities Using Employer-Owned Equipment 
The Board has consistently held that employees do not possess a right 
to use employer-owned communications equipment, other than email 
systems, for Section 7 purposes.
58
 Such property has ranged from 
communications equipment as rudimentary as bulletin boards,
59
 to more 
advanced equipment like public address systems,
60
 televisions,
61
 and copy 
machines.
62
 The Board also unequivocally stated in Churchill’s 
Supermarkets
63
 that “an employer ha[s] every right to restrict the use of 
company telephones to business-related conversations.”64  
 
 
enforcement denied in part, 557 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1977); see also Marshall Field & Co., 98 
N.L.R.B. 88, 95–96 (1952) (holding that protected activities must be permitted in department store’s 
public eating area because it was not a sales area), modified on other grounds and enforced, 200 F.2d 
375 (7th Cir. 1952). 
 56. Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 793–94.  
 57. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 540 (1992). 
 58. See infra notes 59–64. 
 59. Eaton Techs., 322 N.L.R.B. 848, 853 (1997) (“It is well established that there is no statutory 
right of employees or a union to use an employer’s bulletin board.”); see also NLRB v. Southwire Co., 
801 F.2d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 60. Heath Co., 196 N.L.R.B. 134 (1972) (refusal to allow pro-union employees to respond to 
anti-union broadcasts did not interfere with the conduct of a free and fair representation election).  
 61. Mid-Mountain Foods, Inc., 332 NLRB 229, 230 (2000) (finding no statutory right to use 
break room television to show pro-union video), enforced, 269 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 62. Champion Int’l Corp., 303 N.L.R.B. 102, 109 (1991) (employer possesses “a basic right to 
regulate and restrict employee use of [copy machine]”). 
 63. 285 N.L.R.B. 138 (1987), enforced, 857 F.2d 1474 (6th Cir. 1988).  
 64. Id. at 155; Union Carbide Corp., 259 N.L.R.B. 974, 980 (1981) (employer “could 
unquestionably bar its telephones to any personal use by employees”), enforced in relevant part, 714 
F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1983). 
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III. THE BOARD’S TREATMENT OF EMPLOYER-OWNED EMAIL SYSTEMS 
A. The Early Approaches  
Despite the unambiguous background of “equipment cases,” the Board 
struggled early on to define the scope of employees’ Section 7 rights to 
use employer-owned email systems. As early as 1993, the Board ruled that 
an employer could not discriminatorily allow employees to use the email 
system for all types of communications except to organize a union.
65
 
However, that case turned on the clearly discriminatory treatment of the 
union organizers, rather than on non-discriminatory prohibitions.
66
 
Another early case, Timekeeping Systems,
67
 involved a mass email sent 
by an employee that disputed the employer’s assertions about proposed 
changes to its holiday policies. The Board found that the employer 
unlawfully discharged the employee for this email.
68
 However, the 
decision turned on the nature of the employee’s speech, rather than the 
forum in which it was communicated.
69
 
As employers began to assert in the late 1990s and early 2000s that the 
same standards applicable to copy machines, public address systems, and 
telephones should also apply to email systems, the NLRB General 
Counsel’s Division of Advice (the Division of Advice) issued Advice 
Memoranda in several cases.
70
 The first such case was Pratt & Whitney
71
 
 
 
 65. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 919 (1993).  
 66. Id. Consistent with this limited holding, the Board granted the employer’s motion to alter the 
cease and desist remedy from cease and desist from “prohibiting bargaining unit employees from using 
the electronic mail system for distributing union literature and notices” to cease and desist from 
“[d]iscriminatorily prohibiting bargaining unit employees from using the electronic mail system for 
distributing union literature and notices.” Id. at 897, 920 (emphasis added). 
 67. Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244 (1997). 
 68. Id. at 244.  
 69. Id. The administrative law judge in Timekeeping Systems did address the employer’s 
contention that the employee’s emails amounted to a “take-over” of the email system, as in 
Washington Adventist Hospital, 291 N.L.R.B. 95 (1988), where an employee had used emails to 
disrupt transmissions between that employer’s computer terminals. Timekeeping Sys., 323 N.L.R.B. at 
249. However, the judge distinguished Washington Adventist with reference to American Hospital 
Association, 230 N.L.R.B. 54 (1977), a case involving employee distribution of hard copy pamphlets. 
Timekeeping Sys., 323 N.L.R.B. at 249. 
 70. The Division of Advice is an office of the General Counsel. Regional offices submit cases 
involving novel, complex, or otherwise significant cases to the Division of Advice for legal opinions 
on those matters. Who We Are: Organization Chart, NLRB.GOV (Nov. 14, 2015, 1:38 PM), 
https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/organization-chart [https://perma.cc/5UTT-NA5Y]. 
 71. Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Div. of Advice, to Rochelle 
Kentov, Reg’l Dir., Region 12 (Feb. 23, 1998), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/12-CA-018446. 
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in 1998. There, the employer prohibited all non-business use of its email 
system.
72
 The Division of Advice noted, “the evidence indicates that the 
employees in the instant cases use the Employer’s computers and 
computer network in such a way as to make them ‘work areas’ within the 
meaning of Republic Aviation and Stoddard-Quirk.”73 The Division of 
Advice acknowledged, but rejected, the employer’s objections that email, 
like paper litter, “can take up cyberspace,” and that even emails sent 
during the sender’s non-working time are likely to appear during the 
recipient’s working time.74 
The Division of Advice subsequently relied on its Pratt & Whitney 
Memorandum when the issue arose,
75
 but noted that in some 
circumstances, there exist disparate reasons to apply or decline to apply 
this analysis.
76
 Some of these Memoranda stated, as early as 2004, that the 
Board would decide the issue in the pending Register Guard case.
77
 The 
uncertain environment regarding employees’ use of employer email 
systems persisted until that case was decided. 
B. The Bush Board Decides Register Guard—2007 
The Register Guard case arose when Suzi Prozanski, an employee of a 
newspaper publisher and president of her local union, sent three emails to 
employees at their company email addresses regarding union business.
78
 
 
 
 72. Id. at 1. 
 73. Id. at 3. 
 74. Id. at 4.  
 75. See, e.g., Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Div. of Advice, to 
Claude L. Witherspoon, Acting Reg’l Dir., Region 16 (Apr. 11, 2000), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/16-
CA-020176. Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Div. of Advice, to Martha 
Kinard, Acting Reg’l Dir., Region 16 (Oct. 18, 1999) (finding prohibition unlawful even though “TU 
Electric’s employees utilize their email system to a lesser extent than the Pratt & Whitney employees 
did.”), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/16-CA-019810. 
 76. See Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Div. of Advice, to James J. 
McDermott, Reg’l Dir.; Byron B. Kohn, Reg’l Attorney; Tony Bisceglia, Assistant to Reg’l Dir., 
Region 31 (Jan. 13, 2003) (warehouse and driving employees have limited access to email, so email 
system is not part of their working area), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/31-CA-025962; Memorandum 
from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Div. of Advice, to James S. Scott, Reg’l Dir. Region 32 
(Jan. 18, 2001) (same for employees performing driving, production, and maintenance work); 
Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Div. of Advice, to Roberto G. Chavarry, 
Reg’l Dir., Region 13 (Nov. 26, 2004) [hereinafter Banca di Roma Memorandum] (recommending 
dismissal because blanket prohibition had been ignored by management and employees alike, and 
there was no indication that the policy would be enforced in the future), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-
CA-041283. 
 77. See, e.g., Banca di Roma Memorandum, supra note 76. 
 78. The Guard Publ’g Co. (Register Guard), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1111–12 (2007). The first 
email, sent using an employer-owned computer, disputed an email sent to employees by the 
newspaper’s managing editor, which claimed that the police had notified the employer that anarchists 
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The employer issued written warnings to Prozanski for using the 
company’s email system to conduct union business in violation of the 
employer’s Communications Systems Policy (CSP).79  
The CSP prohibited employees from using the email system to solicit 
on behalf of outside organizations.
80
 Management knew that employees 
sometimes used the email system for personal solicitation purposes, such 
as party invitations or requests for dog walkers, but the employer’s 
periodic United Way campaign constituted the only solicitation for outside 
organizations that could be shown.
81
  
The union filed unfair labor practice charges, and the General 
Counsel’s Regional Office issued complaints, alleging that the employer’s 
maintenance of the CSP violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and that the 
written warnings issued to Prozanski violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (3).
82
 
The administrative law judge found that the CSP was lawful as written,
83
 
but was discriminatorily applied to Prozanski’s union activities because 
the employer allowed employees to use the email system for personal 
purposes other than union activities.
84
  
The Board, in a three-to-two decision along party lines, held that 
employees do not have a statutory right to use their employer’s email 
system for Section 7 purposes.
85
 The majority recognized that the issue 
was whether electronic communications had changed “the pattern of 
industrial life . . . to the extent that the forms of workplace communication 
sanctioned in Republic Aviation ha[d] been rendered useless and that 
employee use of the Respondent’s e-mail system for Section 7 purposes 
 
 
might attend a planned union rally. Prozanski’s email attached an email from the police stating that it 
was the employer who had notified police that anarchists might attend. Id. at 1111. Prozanski’s second 
email, sent from a computer in the union’s office, asked employees to wear green to work in support of 
the union’s position in contract bargaining. Id. at 1112. The third email, also sent from a union-owned 
computer, asked employees to participate in the union’s entry in an upcoming parade. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1111–12. 
 80. Id. at 1111. The relevant provision of the policy stated:  
Company communication systems and the equipment used to operate the communication 
system are owned and provided by the Company to assist in conducting the business of The 
Register-Guard. Communications systems are not to be used to solicit or proselytize for 
commercial ventures, religious or political causes, outside organizations, or other non-job-
related solicitations.  
Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. The judge observed, “The Board has yet to hold that an e-mail system owned by an employer 
constitutes a workplace where an employer is prohibited from limiting all employee Section 7 
solicitation.” Id. at 1136. 
 84. Id. at 1136–37. 
 85. Id. at 1110. 
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must therefore be mandated.”86 The Board, in other words, once again 
engaged in the balancing of employer property rights against employee 
Section 7 rights. 
While it acknowledged that “e-mail has, of course, had a substantial 
impact on how people communicate, both at and away from the 
workplace,” the Board found that the Section 7 interests served by 
employee utilization of email systems were minimal because “employees 
at the [employer]’s workplace have the full panoply of rights to engage in 
oral solicitation on nonworking time and also to distribute literature on 
nonworking time in nonwork areas, pursuant to Republic Aviation and 
Stoddard-Quirk.”87 It reasoned that the continued existence of these rights 
matters because “Republic Aviation requires the employer to yield its 
property interests to the extent necessary to ensure that employees will not 
be ‘entirely deprived[]’ . . . of their ability to engage in Section 7 
communications in the workplace on their own time.”88 The Board also 
emphasized precedent holding that employers’ property interests in 
equipment such as televisions and telephones
89
 outweigh employees’ 
interests in using such equipment for Section 7 purposes.
90
 
Similarly to employers’ legitimate business interests in that equipment, 
employers’ business interests in email systems include the system’s 
efficient operation, protection against viruses, diminished server space, 
dissemination of confidential information, and liability for employees’ 
inappropriate emails.
91
 As a result, the Board determined that the “basic 
property right” of employers to “regulate and restrict employee use of 
company property”92 applies to email systems in the same manner as it 
applies to other employer-owned equipment. The recognition of this right 
rendered inapplicable the Republic Aviation presumption that a blanket 
 
 
 86. Id. at 1116. 
 87. Id. at 1115–16.  
 88. Id. at 1115 (quoting Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 801 n.6 (1945)). 
 89. See supra notes 59–64. 
 90. Register Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1114. The majority acknowledged that: 
e-mail has some differences from as well as some similarities to other communications 
methods, such as telephone systems. For example, as the dissent points out, transmission of 
an e-mail message, unlike a telephone conversation, does not normally ‘tie up’ the line and 
prevent the simultaneous transmission of messages by others. On the other hand, e-mail 
messages are similar to telephone calls in many ways. Both enable virtually instant 
communication regardless of distance, both are transmitted electronically, usually through 
wires (sometimes the very same fiber-optic cables) over complex networks, and both require 
specialized electronic devices for their transmission.  
Id. at 1116. 
 91. Id. at 1114. 
 92. Id. (quoting Union Carbide Corp. v. NLRB, 714 F.2d 657, 663–64 (6th Cir. 1983)). 
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ban on solicitation is unlawful absent special circumstances.
93
 
Accordingly, the Board determined that employees do not have a statutory 
right to use employer-owned email systems for Section 7 purposes.
94
   
Based upon this conclusion, the Board agreed with the administrative 
law judge that the employer’s CSP did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the 
Act on its face.
95
 The Board also found that the first of Prozanski’s 
disciplinary warnings violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) as a discriminatory 
application of the CSP, but found no violation based on the warning for 
her second and third emails.
96
  
Democratic Members Liebman and Walsh dissented vehemently. They 
first argued that email had drastically changed workplace society: 
Today’s decision confirms that the NLRB has become the ‘Rip Van 
Winkle of administrative agencies.’ Only a Board that has been 
asleep for the past 20 years could fail to recognize that e-mail has 
revolutionized communication both within and outside the 
workplace. In 2007, one cannot reasonably contend, as the majority 
does, that an e-mail system is a piece of communications equipment 
to be treated just as the law treats bulletin boards, telephones, and 
pieces of scrap paper. National labor policy must be responsive to 
the enormous technological changes that are taking place in our 
society.
97
 
Second, the dissent took aim at the majority’s assertion that the 
employer’s property interest in its equipment removes it from the Republic 
Aviation framework. It asserted that the issue pertained to “cyberspace,” 
which is not owned by anyone, and not to “equipment.”98  
Third, the dissent accused the majority of substituting the Lechmere 
standard (regarding facility access by non-employee union organizers) for 
 
 
 93. Id. at 1115. 
 94. Id. at 1110. 
 95. Id. at 1116. 
 96. Id. at 1119–20. The Board made these determinations pursuant to a new articulation of 
“discrimination” as drawing distinctions “along Section 7 lines.” Id. at 1117–19. While beyond the 
scope of this Note, this important and often overlooked aspect of the Register Guard decision remains 
the Board standard even after Purple Communications. Purple Commc’ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, 
at 5 n.13 (2014). 
 97. Id. at 1122 (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting NLRB v. 
Thill, Inc., 980 F.2d 1137, 1142 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
 98. Id. at 1126 (“[E]-mail, the ‘World Wide Web,’ and mail listing services ‘constitute a unique 
medium—known to its users as “cyberspace”—located in no particular geographic location but 
available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet.’” (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 
U.S. 844, 850 (1997))). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss2/9
p 511 Kuntz book pages.docx2/14/2017  
 
 
 
 
 
2016] CROSSED WIRES 525 
 
 
 
 
the Republic Aviation standard for protected activity by employees.
99
 This 
criticism targeted the majority’s reliance on the fact that employees can 
still communicate with each other through other means, such as face-to-
face contact, without using their employer’s email system.100  
The D.C. Circuit reviewed the objections to Register Guard.
101
 The 
court agreed with the union that all of Prozanski’s warnings violated 
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) because they were discriminatorily issued.
102
 The 
union did not challenge the CSP’s facial validity.103  
C. Backlash to Register Guard 
The Board’s Register Guard decision provoked vociferous criticism 
from pro-labor advocates. One local union categorized the decision as part 
of an “all-out attack on the labor movement.”104 AFL-CIO General 
Counsel Jonathan Hiatt stated that the Board “has again struck at the heart 
of what the nation’s labor laws were intended to protect—the right of 
employees to discuss working conditions and other matters of mutual 
concern” because “[a]nyone with e-mail knows that this is how employees 
communicate with each other in today’s workplace.”105 
Pro-labor scholars also accused the Register Guard Board of failing to 
adapt to changing circumstances. William Corbett, for example, argued 
that the Board “interpreted the NLRA in a restrictive way that threatens to 
make it irrelevant and obsolescent.”106 Jeffrey Hirsch expressed a similar 
perspective, describing the decision as a “disturbing . . . . failure [that] 
 
 
 99. Id. at 1126–27 (citing Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992)). 
 100. Id. The majority disputed this characterization, clarifying that it only referred to alternative 
means in order to assess how email had changed the workplace. Id. at 1116 n.12 (citing Lechmere, 502 
U.S. 527). 
 101. Guard Publ’g Co. v. NLRB, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  
 102. Id. at 59–61.  
 103. Id. at 58 (“The union states that, although it believes the company violated section 8(a)(1) by 
maintaining a policy that prohibited e-mail use for all ‘non-job-related solicitations,’ it does not seek 
review of the Board’s ruling to the contrary.”). According to AFL-CIO Associate General Counsel 
James Coppess, the union did not seek review of this issue because the court would likely view the 
issue as a policy choice within the Board’s discretion. Susan J. McGolrick, D.C. Circuit Rules Guard 
Publishing Illegally Disciplined Copy Editor for E-Mails, BNA DAILY LAB. REP. No. 128 at AA-1 
(July 8, 2009). Furthermore, since the 2008 election had occurred in the interim, the union felt 
optimistic that a Board appointed by President Obama would reverse Register Guard at its first 
opportunity. Id.  
 104. The Bush NLRB and What It Has Done to American Workers, TEAMSTERS LOCAL 19, 
http://www.teamsterslocal19.org/NLRB_Flyer-basic_with_cites_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/HE9H-JQUY]. 
 105. Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board Restricts Union Use of E-Mail, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/23/us/23labor.html?_r=0. 
 106. William R. Corbett, Awaking Rip Van Winkle: Has the National Labor Relations Act 
Reached a Turning Point?, 9 NEV. L.J. 247, 252 (2009). 
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highlights the fact that the Board has yet again shown no inclination to 
reassess broadly its enforcement of the NLRA to reflect the nature of the 
modern economy.”107 Register Guard, Hirsch argued, constituted 
significant evidence of the Act’s “obsolescence.”108 
Member Liebman also made it clear that these sentiments were shared 
by the Board’s Democratic appointees. In a speech at the University at 
Buffalo Law School, she referred to Register Guard, stating, “This case I 
sometimes subtitle ‘The Act is Surely Dead,’ if the majority could not find 
a way to accommodate employees’ rights to communicate with each other 
at the workplace through this new technology.”109 
President Obama appointed Lafe Solomon, one of outgoing Chairman 
Liebman’s staff members, as Acting General Counsel on June 21, 2010.110 
Ten months later, Solomon issued a General Counsel Memorandum 
identifying cases that regional offices must send to the internal Division of 
Advice for evaluation as potential policy priorities.
111
 Solomon listed 
“[c]ases involving the issue of whether employees have a Section 7 right 
to use an employer’s e-mail system” among the “[c]ases requiring 
development of a litigation strategy in light of adverse circuit court law or 
new Board precedent.”112 The (Acting) General Counsel’s office thus 
officially announced its interest in providing the Obama Board with an 
opportunity to overturn Register Guard.
113
 
 
 
 107. Hirsch, supra note 31, at 278. 
 108. Id. at 262. Additionally, the title of Hirsch’s article, “The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet 
Kill the NLRA?” asks a question that demonstrates the depth of pro-labor scholars’ dissatisfaction 
with Register Guard and other NLRB decisions related to technology. See also Jeffrey M. Hirsch, 
Communication Breakdown: Reviving the Role of Discourse in the Regulation of Employee Collective 
Action, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1091, 1121–22 (2011). 
 109. Wilma B. Liebman, Values and Assumptions of the Bush NLRB: Trumping Workers’ Rights, 
57 BUFF. L. REV. 643, 647 (2009) (transcript of remarks at a September 19, 2008 symposium). Four 
months later, President Obama appointed her as the first Board Chairman of his presidency. Press 
Release, NLRB, Wilma Liebman Designated NLRB Chairman (Jan. 22, 2009), https://www.nlrb.gov/ 
news-outreach/news-releases [https://perma.cc/4HHT-G88E]. 
 110. Who We Are: The General Counsel—Lafe Solomon, NLRB.GOV, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-
we-are/general-counsel/lafe-solomon [https://perma.cc/U4NQ-XNCN]. Solomon served in this 
capacity until November 2013, though the Senate never confirmed his appointment as General 
Counsel. Obama’s Lawless Labor Board, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 11, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
obamas-lawless-labor-board-1439336842.  
 111. Memorandum from Lafe E. Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, to All Reg’l Dirs., Officers-in-
Charge, & Resident Officers (Apr. 12, 2011), Memorandum from Lafe E. Solomon, Acting Gen. 
Counsel, to All Reg’l Dirs., Officers-in-Charge, & Resident Officers (Apr. 12, 2011), 
https://www.nlrb.gov/reports-guidance/general-counsel-memos (select GC 11-xx from the drop box, 
then select the document). 
 112. Id. at 2–3.  
 113. No such vehicle to challenge Register Guard reached the Board during Solomon’s tenure as 
Acting General Counsel. As a result, this mandate was reiterated by newly-appointed (and confirmed) 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss2/9
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D. Purple Communications—December 11, 2014 
The opportunity to re-examine this issue came before the Board in late 
2014. The employer in that case, Purple Communications, provided sign 
language interpretation services at sixteen southern California video call 
centers.
114
 The union, Communications Workers of America, filed 
petitions to represent seven of those facilities in the autumn of 2012.
115
 
The union, after failing to win elections at two of the facilities, filed 
objections to those elections, alleging that the employer’s rules restricting 
email usage interfered with employees’ free choice in the elections.116 The 
union also filed an unfair labor practice charge in support of those 
objections.
117
 
Three of the employer’s handbook rules implicated Register Guard 
issues. The first such rule stated that the employer’s electronic equipment, 
Internet access, and email system “should be used for business purposes 
only.”118 The second and third rules prohibited using the employer’s 
equipment, internet, or email for “[e]ngaging in activities on behalf of 
organizations or persons with no professional or business affiliation with 
the Company” or “[s]ending uninvited email of a personal nature.”119 The 
administrative law judge, relying on Register Guard, dismissed these 
allegations.
120
 The General Counsel then sought review from the Board.
121
 
The Board framed its analysis as a reevaluation of the balancing of 
interests examined in Register Guard by identifying three arguments, 
which, taken together, encompass both sides of the balance of interests.
122
 
The majority first generally asserted that Register Guard had “undervalued 
employees’ core Section 7 right to communicate in the workplace about 
their terms and conditions of employment, while giving too much weight 
 
 
General Counsel Richard Griffin in his first such memorandum. Memorandum from Richard Griffin, 
Jr., Gen. Counsel, to All Reg’l Dir.s, Officers-in-Charge, & Resident Officers (Feb. 25, 2014). 
 114. Purple Commc’ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B No. 126, at 2 (Dec. 11, 2014). 
 115. Id. at 3. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 2. 
 119. Id. at 3. 
 120. Id. at 63. As the administrative law judge acknowledged, he was bound to abide by Board 
precedent and to allow the Board itself to consider the merits of overturning its precedent. Id. (citing 
Pathmark Stores, 342 N.L.R.B. 378, 378 n.1 (2004); Hebert Indus. Insulation Corp., 312 N.L.R.B. 602, 
608 (1993); and Lumber & Mill Emp’rs Ass’n., 265 N.L.R.B. 199, 199 n.2 (1982), enforced, 736 F.2d 
507 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 934 (1984)). 
 121. Id. at 3. 
 122. Id. at 4–5.  
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to employers’ property rights.”123 Second, the Board argued that Register 
Guard had undervalued the importance of email to employee 
communications.
124
 Third, the majority attacked Register Guard as relying 
too heavily on earlier Board decisions discussing employers’ property 
rights to their equipment.
125
 
The Board focused its argument about the importance of workplace 
email to employees’ Section 7 rights on the workplace as the locus of 
protected activities.
126
 The Board argued that this focus motivated the 
Supreme Court’s articulation of the “special circumstances” standard in 
Republic Aviation.
127
 
Next, the Board relied on several studies showing the pervasive role of 
email in the workplace.
128
 It pointed to the decreased costs of email due to 
ever-increasing processer and hard drive capabilities,
129
 as well as the 
development that “[m]any employers expect or at least tolerate personal 
use of [electronic communications] equipment by employees because it 
often increases worker efficiency.”130 Furthermore, telework arrangements 
have accompanied increases in technological capabilities.
131
 Based on 
 
 
 123. Id. at 4.  
 124. Id. at 4–5. 
 125. Id. at 5. 
 126. Id. (“The workplace is ‘a particularly appropriate place for [employees to exercise their 
Section 7 rights], because it is the one place where [employees] clearly share common interests and 
where they traditionally seek to persuade fellow workers in matters affecting their union organizational 
life and other matters related to their status as employees.’” (quoting Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 
556, 574 (1978))). 
 127. Id. at 6 (citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803–04 (1945)).   
 128. Id. at 6–7. The Board relied on the Radicati Group’s April 2014 conclusions that “[e]mail 
remains the most pervasive form of communication in the business world” and “that work-related 
email traffic will continue to increase.” Id. at 6–7 (quoting THE RADICATI GROUP, INC., EMAIL 
STATISTICS REPORT, 2014–2018, at 2, 4 (Sara Radicati ed., 2014), http://www.radicati.com/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/Email-Statistics-Report-2014-2018-Executive-Summary.pdf). Additionally, a 
2008 Pew Research Center Study showed that “96 percent of employees used the internet, email, or 
mobile telephones to keep them connected to their jobs, even outside of their normal work hours.” Id. 
at 6 (citing MARY MADDEN & SYDNEY JONES, NETWORKED WORKERS, PEW RESEARCH CENTER’S 
INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT 1 (2008), http://www.pewinternet.org/2008 /09/24/networked-
workers). 
 129. Id. at 7 n.24. 
 130. Id. at 7 (quoting City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010)). It should be noted that 
the Quon case involved text messages on a pager, rather than an email system. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 at 
750. 
 131. Purple Commc’ns, at 7 (citing Latest Telecommuting Statistics, GLOBAL WORKPLACE 
ANALYTICS (Sept. 2013), http://globalworkplaceanalytics.com/telecommuting-statistics; Dinah 
Wisenberg Brin, Telecommuting Likely to Grow, Despite High-Profile Defections, SOCIETY FOR 
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (July 24, 2013), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-
topics/technology/pages/telecommuting-likely-to-grow-bans.aspx; Larry Dignan, 2014 Enterprise 
Trends: BYOD pain, HTML5 Apps, Hybrid Cloud, SDx, ZDNET (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.zdnet. 
com/2014enterprise-trends-byod-pain-html5-apps-hybrid-cloud-sdx-7000021705).  
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these developments, the Board likened email communications to 
workplace cafeterias as “‘the natural gathering place’ for employees to 
communicate with each other.”132 As a result, it described Register 
Guard’s “reluctance” to “fully acknowledge” email’s role in the modern 
workplace as “a failure ‘to adapt the Act to the changing patterns of 
industrial life.’”133 
The Board then turned to Register Guard’s reliance on “equipment” 
cases.
134
 This analysis focused first on the property rights aspect of the 
balancing of interests, emphasizing that one person’s use of email does not 
interfere with another’s use, or add significant costs, particularly in light of 
increased computing capacities.
135
 Even though telephones are comparable 
to email systems in many respects, the majority decided to draw a line 
between these two types of equipment by categorizing them as “distant 
cousins.”136 
The Board also rejected, in a footnote, the dissent’s contention that 
increased use of other forms of technology, including personal email, 
texting, and social media, tipped the balance of interests in favor of 
employers’ property rights because these developments made employees’ 
use of employer-owned email systems less necessary to Section 7 
activities.
137
 The majority premised this rejection on the value that 
precedent placed on communications “in the workplace”138 and explained 
that employees view Section 7 communications as work-related, rather 
than personal, in nature.
139
 While agreeing that these other forms of 
technology facilitate communications amongst groups of people, the 
Board reasoned, “[e]mployees do not share all of the same private media 
options, due to the cost and variety of those options; some employees do 
not privately use any electronic media.”140 As a result, employees who 
work at different facilities, on different shifts, or in different departments, 
may be “virtual strangers” to one another with “no practical way to obtain 
 
 
 132. Id. at 8 (quoting Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 505 (1978)). 
 133. Id.  (quoting Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 521, 523 (1976)). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 8–9.  
 136. Id. at 9. The Board noted that the General Counsel had argued for reversal of the Board’s 
prior telephone cases in addition to Register Guard. However, since that issue was not directly 
presented in this case, the Board declined to decide the telephone issue. Id. at 9 n.38.  
 137. Id. at 6 n.18. 
 138. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 574 (1978); NLRB v. 
Magnavox Co. of Tennessee, 415 U.S. 322 (1974)). 
 139. Id.  
 140. Id. 
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each other’s email addresses, social media account information, or other 
information necessary to reach each other.”141  
Furthermore, the majority, like the Register Guard dissent, asserted 
that the Republican Board members’ argument inappropriately applied the 
reasonable alternative means standard for non-employee access to 
facilities.
142
 Consequently, its decision did not “turn on the current 
availability of alternative communication options using personal electronic 
devices and other electronic media—e.g., Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, 
blogging, or personal email accounts.”143 The Board’s justification for 
disregarding other means of communication relied largely on a statement 
by Justice Brennan in Beth Israel that, “outside of the health-care context, 
the availability of alternative means of communication is not, with respect 
to employee organizational activity, a necessary inquiry.”144 As a result, 
the Board concluded that alternative means of engaging in protected 
activities are only relevant for non-employees.
145
 
The Board thus decided that the Republic Aviation standard that 
protected activities must be permitted absent “special circumstances” 
applied to employees’ use of employer-owned email systems.146 It viewed 
this determination as “consistent with the purposes and policies of the Act, 
with our responsibility to adapt the Act to the changing work environment, 
and with our obligation to accommodate the competing rights of 
employers and employees.”147 
The majority also decided that it would apply this new standard 
retroactively.
148
 However, retroactivity required that the case be remanded 
to the administrative law judge in order to allow for the application of the 
new standard to these facts.
149
 The case, as of this writing, remains 
 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 14. 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. at 13 n.62 (quoting Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 505 (1978)).  
 145. Id. at 14 (citing Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 540 (1992)). 
 146. Id. The majority acknowledged that this standard makes it possible for an employer to 
establish special circumstances warranting a prohibition of employee use of an employer-owned email 
system for protected activities, but viewed such circumstances as a “rare case.” Id. 
 147. Id. The Board also clarified that employers continue to possess the ability to monitor their 
email systems for legitimate business reasons without being vulnerable to allegations that they 
unlawfully surveilled employees’ protected activities. Id. at 15–16 (“[T]hose who choose openly to 
engage in union activities at or near the employer’s premises cannot be heard to complain when 
management observes them.” (quoting Eddyleon Chocolate Co., 301 N.L.R.B. 887, 888 (1991)). 
 148. Id. at 16–17. The Board applies new standards retroactively unless doing so will cause a 
“manifest injustice.” Id. at 16 (quoting Pattern Makers (Michigan Model Mfrs.), 310 N.L.R.B. 929, 
931 (1993)).  
 149. Id. at 17.  
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pending.
150
 As a result, no Court of Appeals has yet had occasion to 
address the Board’s Purple Communications holding.151 
Dissenting Member Philip Miscimarra began by attacking the 
majority’s refusal to consider how other forms of electronic 
communication have changed interpersonal communications.
152
 He also 
asserted that evaluation of alternatives is appropriate beyond non-
employee access cases based on the manner in which the Board and the 
Supreme Court have balanced interests in the past.
153
 He noted that the 
majority’s argument on this point was particularly wanting because it 
relied on the premise that activities at the workplace were especially 
valuable but discounted other means of communication such as text 
messaging and social media.
154
 
Miscimarra then argued that, because the majority had overvalued the 
importance of access to employer-owned email systems to employees’ 
Section 7 rights, its balancing of employer property rights and employee 
rights was fundamentally flawed.
155
 He noted that the Board had recently 
decided many cases in which employees, without a statutory right to use 
their employers’ email systems, had nonetheless utilized other 
technological developments to further protected activities.
156
 Miscimarra 
 
 
 150. The administrative law judge found on March 16, 2015 that special circumstances justifying 
the employer’s rule did not exist, and thus that it violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining 
these rules. Purple Commc’ns, Inc., No. 21-CA-095151, 2015 WL 1169344 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges 
Mar. 16, 2015). The parties filed exceptions and cross-exceptions with the Board, and the final briefs 
regarding these exceptions were filed on July 7, 2015. Docket Activity, NLRB.GOV, 
https://www.nlrb.gov/case/21-CA-095151 [https://perma.cc/G29B-3RRS]. The Board has not yet 
issued a decision regarding these exceptions. Id. 
 151. The Purple Communications decision has, however, been applied to other Board cases, one 
of which may reach a Court of Appeals before Purple Communications does. One such case was 
decided on August 27, 2015. UPMC, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 191 (2015). UPMC, extending Purple 
Communications to the healthcare industry and appearing to represent a strong candidate case, is 
currently pending a motion for reconsideration filed by the employer to the Board on October 2, 2015. 
Docket Activity, NLRB.GOV, https://www.nlrb.gov/case/06-CA-081896 [https://perma.cc/ZAP3-
VXMG]. However, even multiple adverse rulings from the courts of appeals will not alter regional 
office charge investigations, administrative law judge decisions, or Board adjudications, until and 
unless either the Supreme Court or the Board itself alters the Purple Communications standard. See 
Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 615, 616 (1963). 
 152. Purple Commc’ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, at 18 (Dec. 11, 2014) (Miscimarra, Member, 
dissenting). 
 153. Id. at 20. Member Miscimarra relied particularly on the balancing of interests conducted by 
the Supreme Court in both Republic Aviation and in Beth Israel. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 
U.S. 483, 489–90 (1978) (upholding employee rights to engage in protected activities in cafeteria, in 
part, because employee locker rooms provided insufficient opportunities to exercise rights).  
 154. Purple Commc’ns, Inc., at 21 n.29.  
 155. Id. at 22–24. 
 156. Id. at 22–23 (citing Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 31 (2014) (employee 
used Facebook); Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (2012) (same); Laurus Tech. 
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also pointed to the power of social media, video websites, and mobile 
devices in the Arab Spring uprisings.
157
 
He then turned to the importance of employers’ property rights, 
criticizing the majority’s assertions that employees’ emails impose few 
costs on employers as “the perspective of someone who misunderstands 
the nature of property rights or is determined to disregard them.”158 He 
likened the majority’s standard to a requirement that any employer 
maintaining a company car must permit its employees to take the car 
wherever they wish.
159
 
Finally, Miscimarra emphasized that the 1937 Supreme Court case that 
established the Act’s constitutionality relied on a balancing of employees’ 
collective action and employers’ property rights.160 Even then, he argued, 
the Court validated the Act because the statute, “instead of being an 
invasion of the constitutional rights of either [employers or employees], 
was based on the recognition of the rights of both.”161 
Member Miscimarra concluded his argument by objecting that the 
Board’s new standard would be difficult for all parties to administer and 
understand, particularly with regard to “working time” and “work[ing] 
area” requirements.162 Based upon all of these considerations, Miscimarra 
asserted that “the Board cannot reasonably conclude . . . given the current 
state of electronic communications[,] that an employer-maintained email 
system devoted exclusively to business purposes constitutes an 
‘unreasonable impediment to self-organization.’”163 
Member Johnson’s dissent expanded even further on Member 
Miscimarra’s reliance on other forms of electronic communications 
available to employees.
164
 However, Johnson also made an argument that 
 
 
Inst., 360 N.L.R.B. No. 133 (2014) (employee used text messages); Salon/Spa at Boro, Inc., 356 
NLRB 444 (2010) (same)). 
 157. Id. at 23 (citing Philip N. Howard et al., Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of 
Social Media During the Arab Spring? 8–13 (Project on Info. Tech. & Pol. Islam, Working Paper no. 
2011.1, 2011), http://philhoward.org/opening-closed-regimes-what-was-the-role-of-social-media-during-
the-arab-spring/). 
 158. Id. at 23–24. 
 159. Id. at 24. 
 160. Id. (discussing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)). 
 161. Id. (quoting Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 33–34). 
 162. Id. at 24–26. 
 163. Id. at 28 (quoting Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 801 n.6 (1945)). 
 164. Id. at 29 (Johnson, Member, dissenting) (“The question presented here is whether the [Act] 
requires an employer to surrender possession and control of its own email network so that employee 
communications about [protected] activities related to their employment, may be made as a matter of 
right across that network at any time, effectively including on working time paid for by the employer, 
even when . . . there are multiple other electronic communications networks that employees could use 
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Miscimarra had not explicitly articulated: that the electronic 
communications environment had changed significantly since Register 
Guard.
165
 
Johnson relied on a variety of statistics in support of his assertion that 
“[s]ince Register Guard issued in 2007, there has been [a] dramatic change 
in how individuals communicate with each other.”166 He pointed out, for 
example, that significant changes in device utilization had taken place.
167
 
Mobile phones were owned by 90 percent of Americans by 2014, at which 
point 58 percent owned smartphones and 42 percent owned tablet 
computers.
168
 Furthermore, smartphone ownership was expected to 
increase to 68 percent by 2017.
169
  
Similarly, Johnson noted that personal email accounts allow for 
virtually unlimited messaging and mass emailing capacities.
170
 Users 
utilize these capacities on an extremely regular basis, as shown by the 87.6 
billion personal emails sent per day worldwide.
171
 Consequently, “people 
have at least an equal opportunity to use email in their personal lives as 
they do in their professional ones.”172 
 
 
for such kinds of statements and discussions on their own time, including employees’ own personal 
email . . . .”). 
 165. Id. at 30 (arguing that the majority “failed to consider the revolutionary social networking 
developments that have occurred since Register Guard issued, which make access to employer email 
systems even more unnecessary for employees to engage in Section 7 activity.”). 
 166. Id. at 41.  
 167. Id. at 40. 
 168. Id. (citing Mobile Technology Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 9, 2014), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/mobile-technology-fact-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/R5TC-TDY6]). 
 169. Id. (citing INT’L DATA CORP., ALWAYS CONNECTED FOR FACEBOOK (2013), https://www.idc. 
com/prodserv/custom_solutions/download/case_studies/PLAN-BB_Always_Connected_for_Facebook. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/KXR2-RPYZ]). 
 170. Id. Johnson specifically noted that each of the three major personal email providers provided 
vast amounts of free storage space. Microsoft, for example, provided 15 gigabytes of free document 
storage at the time. Id. (citing MICROSOFT, https://onedrive.live.com/about/en-us/plans/). As of 
January 2016, the website claimed that Microsoft provided a full terabyte of storage. See MICROSOFT, 
https://onedrive.live.com/about/en-us/plans/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2016 11:18 AM). Yahoo! already 
provided a terabyte at the time of the decision. Purple Commc’ns, Inc., at 40 (citing YAHOO!, 
https://overview.mail.yahoo.com). Meanwhile, Google provided 15 gigabytes of free email storage. Id. 
(citing GOOGLE, https:// www.google.com/settings/storage). Each gigabyte, he explained, facilitates 
62,782 pages of word processor format text and 100,099 pages of email file format. Id. (citing How 
Many Pages in a Gigabyte?: LEXIS/NEXIS, https://www.lexisnexis.com/applieddiscovery/lawlibrary/ 
whitePapers/ADI_FS_PagesInAGigabyte.pdf). 
 171. Purple Commc’ns, Inc., at 40 (citing THE RADICATI GRP., INC., supra note 128, at 2–3). 
Johnson emphasized that the majority had cited this report as evidence of the extensive use of business 
emails (109 billion emails per day), but that the number of personal emails sent per day is nearly as 
large. Id.   
 172. Id. at 41. 
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Furthermore, while less than 10% of adult Internet users utilized social 
media in 2005, that figure had ballooned to 72% by September 2013.
173
 
The total number of social media accounts had reached 3.6 billion in 2014, 
and is expected to reach 5.2 billion accounts by the end of 2018.
174
 
Johnson described social media websites such as Facebook, LinkedIn, and 
Twitter as “gigantic,”175 citing examples such as the 17 million Facebook 
posts related to the 2014 ALS “ice bucket challenge,”176 LinkedIn’s 300 
million members,
177
 and the 271 million monthly active Twitter users.
178
 
Furthermore, 42 percent of social media users utilize multiple platforms.
179
 
He also pointed to the extensive use that unions have made of social media 
as an organizational tool as evidence of the effectiveness of social media 
for protected activities.
180
 Consequently, Johnson asserted that “most 
employees already have access to technology which they can use to 
communicate with one another about protected concerted activity without 
needing to use their employer’s business email system.”181 
Johnson further disputed the majority’s dismissal of these other 
communication platforms on the basis that employees may be “virtual 
strangers” with one another.182 Not only do social media websites allow 
users to search for others, but sites such as Facebook and LinkedIn also 
use complex algorithms that enhance search capabilities and suggest 
 
 
 173. Id. (citing Social Networking Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 2014), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/social-networking-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/VVE9-Q4TP]). 
 174. Id. (citing THE RADICATI GRP., INC., supra note 128). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 41 n.30 (citing The Ice Bucket Challenge on Facebook, FACEBOOK (Aug. 18, 2014), 
http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2014/08/the-ice-bucket-challenge-on-facebook [https://perma.cc/GME6 
-SMNV]). 
 177. Id. (citing LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/about-us (last visited by Johnson Sept. 15, 
2014)). Consistent with Johnson’s point that these technologies will continue to grow, the LinkedIn 
website, as of January 2016, had been updated to claim 400 million members. LINKEDIN, 
http://www.linkedin.com/about-us (last visited Jan. 14, 2016 7:47 PM). 
 178. Purple Commc’ns, Inc., at 41 n.30 (citing TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com/company (last 
visited by Johnson Sept. 15, 2014)). As with LinkedIn, Twitter usage has continued to grow. As of 
January 2016, the Twitter website stated that Twitter had 321 million monthly active users. TWITTER, 
https://about.twitter.com/company (last visited Jan. 14, 2016 7:58 PM). 
 179. Purple Commc’ns, Inc., at 41 (citing MAEVE DUGGAN & AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH 
CTR., SOCIAL MEDIA UPDATE 2013 1–2 (2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2013/12/PIP_Social-
Networking-2013.pdf. 
 180. Id. at 42 (citing Robert Quackenboss, Technology: Friending the Unions, INSIDE COUNSEL 
(Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/04/20/technology-friending-the-unions). 
 181. Id. at 41. Johnson subsequently noted the increased role of text messages in communications, 
noting that 81% of mobile phone users sent or received text messages as of May 2013. Id. at 42 (citing 
Mobile Technology Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CTR., http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/mobile-
technology-fact-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/R5TC-TDY6]). Elsewhere, he asserted that personal email 
accounts perform a similar function. Id. at 40–41. 
 182. Id. at 55–56. 
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potential connections.
183
 Importantly, users can easily search for one 
another by the “employer” field on these sites.184 
Johnson, in addition to advancing the argument that circumstances had 
changed since Register Guard and expanding on many of Member 
Miscimarra’s points,185 also addressed the “reasonable alternative means” 
issue in a section entitled, “The Role of Alternative Means of 
Communication: The Majority’s Dispute with Me, and Why They Are 
Wrong.”186 He first explained that his emphasis on other means of 
communication did not refer to a reasonable alternative means test in the 
vein of non-employee access cases.
187
 Instead, alternative means constitute 
essential aspects of the balancing test endorsed by Republic Aviation.
188
  
Second, Johnson argued that Republic Aviation’s consideration of “the 
availability of alternative areas [of communication of the facility] in which 
§ 7 rights effectively could be exercised” suggests that such analysis is 
appropriate in weighing employees’ rights.189 Johnson then distinguished 
cases cited by the majority purporting to hold to the contrary.
190
 While he 
agreed with the majority that employees need not show that solicitation or 
 
 
 183. Id. at 41. 
 184. Id. (citing Creating a Killer LinkedIn Profile: Tips from Link Humans, LINKEDIN OFFICIAL 
BLOG (July 1, 2014), http://blog.linkedin.com/2014/07/01/creating-a-killer-linkedin-profile-tips-from-
link-humans). 
 185. Johnson elaborated on Miscimarra’s argument that employee use of employer-owned email 
systems for personal purposes infringes on employers’ property rights. He pointed out that email 
discussions are not analogous to “water cooler” discussions because emails, which may arrive at any 
time while an employee is working, can materially interfere with productivity. Id. at 31–34. He also 
asserted that the Board’s equipment cases must apply, and that employee convenience does not require 
a contrary conclusion. Id. at 34–36. Johnson compared the majority’s rationale to “adverse possession 
through . . . work usage.” Id. at 36. Additionally, he viewed the fact that personal emails can be 
authored and received on working time as fundamentally bearing on the interference with employers’ 
property rights within the balancing test due to Republic Aviation’s affirmance that “working time is 
for work.” Id. at 49–51 (citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 n.10 (1945)). 
Furthermore, he asserted that, by requiring employers to “subsidize hostile speech,” that the majority’s 
holding violated the First Amendment. Id. at 56–59. Finally, Johnson strongly emphasized many of the 
practical workability issues identified by Miscimarra’s dissent. Id. at 59–60. 
 186. Id. at 51. 
 187. Id. at 52.  
 188. Id. (citing Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 802). 
 189. Id. (quoting Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 506 (1978)). The Board, in the 
consolidated LeTourneau case, 54 N.L.R.B. 1253 (1944), reasoned that the location and layout of the 
employer’s facility made off-site solicitation very difficult. Id. at 1260–61.   
 190. Purple Commc’ns, Inc., at 53. Johnson focused on Justice Brennan’s statement in Beth Israel 
that “outside of the health-care context, the availability of alternative means of communication is not, 
with respect to employee organizational activity, a necessary inquiry.” Id. (quoting Beth Israel, 437 
U.S. at 505). Johnson noted that this statement did not pertain to physical spaces. Id. More 
importantly, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Beth Israel, Republic Aviation, and other cases cited by 
the majority all take the overall context of employees’ abilities to exercise Section 7 rights into 
account. Id. at 53–54. 
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distribution off of their employer’s property would be “ineffective” in 
order for the balance to tip in their favor, “that does not answer the 
question presented, for various reasons, including that this case does not 
involve solicitations or distributions in physical space.”191  
As a result, Johnson viewed the further growth of mobile devices, 
personal email, text messaging, and social media as weighing heavily in 
favor of finding that the balance of interests tips in favor of employers’ 
property rights.
192
 He concluded, in a forceful echo of the criticisms 
leveled against the Register Guard majority, by arguing: 
My colleagues accuse the Register Guard majority of being Rip 
Van Winkle. But, in ignoring all the changes in social media since 
Register Guard, we need to ask who is the Rip Van Winkle here. 
. . . The Board should get with the present, and concern itself with 
protecting Section 7 rights on that new [technological] frontier. It 
should not be burning up government resources and its claim to 
institutional deference by refighting a war over terrain that 
indisputably no longer matters today to Section 7 . . . .
193
 
IV. CHANGES IN TECHNOLOGY USAGE SINCE 2007 
The Purple Communications majority and Register Guard dissent both 
correctly argued that email has drastically changed the nature of 
interpersonal communications.
194
 While communications have been 
characterized by telephones, traditional mail, and fax machines for most of 
the Act’s history, the rise of email during the last quarter century truly has 
“revolutionized” the manner in which all Americans, including coworkers, 
communicate with one another.
195
 
However, as Members Miscimarra and Johnson explained, the 
revolution has continued to evolve since 2007.
196
 As the Purple 
Communications majority acknowledged, “technological changes are 
continuing; indeed, they are accelerating.”197 Evidence of these 
developments can be found throughout modern society. One reflection of 
continued technological change can be found in the development of the 
 
 
 191. Id. at 55. 
 192. Id. at 61.  
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 6; Register Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1121 (2007) (Liebman & Walsh, Members, 
dissenting). 
 195. Register Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1121 (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissenting). 
 196. Purple Commc’ns, Inc., at 18–41. 
 197. Id. at 17.  
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American Management Association study relied upon by the Register 
Guard dissenters.
198
 The 2004 version of the study focused exclusively on 
email and instant messaging.
199
 However, the 2009 version of the same 
study addressed social media, Twitter, blogs, smartphones, texting, video 
sharing, and personal email, in addition to business email and instant 
messaging.
200
 
Personal email provides the avenue for protected activities that is most 
directly comparable to employer-owned email. As Member Johnson noted, 
the sheer volume of personal emails sent or received per day, 87.6 billion, 
is staggering.
201
 This volume reflects a sharp growth in the utilization of 
personal email spanning the time periods before and after Register 
Guard.
202
 Furthermore, the average consumer now maintains 3.9 personal 
email accounts, more than twice as many as the average number of 
business email accounts (1.7).
203
 Consumers log into personal email 
accounts 3.8 times per day.
204
 Given the extensive role of personal email 
in modern life, it seems disingenuous to argue that employees must have 
access to their employer’s email system in order to effectively exercise 
their Section 7 rights. 
However, even if personal email accounts are insufficient, numerous 
other platforms for interpersonal electronic communications have grown 
explosively in recent years. Text messaging provides one such example. 
While 58 percent of cell phone owners used those phones for text 
 
 
 198. AM. MGMT. ASS’N & EPOL’Y INST., 2004 WORKPLACE E-MAIL AND INSTANT MESSAGING 
SURVEY SUMMARY (2004), http://www.epolicyinstitute.com/2004-workplace-e-mail-and-instant-
messaging-survey-summary [https://perma.cc/8L5P-XTM2]. 
 199. Id. 
 200. AM. MGMT. ASS’N & THE EPOL’Y INST., 2009 ELECTRONIC BUSINESS COMMUNICATION 
POLICIES & PROCEDURES SURVEY (2009), http://www.epolicyinstitute.com/2009-electronic-business-
communication-policies-procedures-survey-results [https://perma.cc/M3VR-9NGT]. The organization’s 
website states that it “anticipate[s] conducting our next [survey] in 2015,” but 2015 results have not 
been released as of the date of this writing. American Management Association/ePolicy Institute 
Surveys, AM. MGMT. ASS’N & THE EPOL’Y INST., http://www.epolicyinstitute.com/american-
management-association-surveys [https://perma.cc/4HZZ-MQ86]. 
 201.  Purple Commc’ns, Inc., at 40 (Johnson, Member, dissenting) (citing THE RADICATI GRP., 
INC., supra note 128). 
 202. Approximately 55 percent of online Americans used email in 2002, and 49 percent of those 
people did so every day. Those numbers increased to 70 percent and 60 percent, respectively, by 2011. 
Kristen Purcell, Search and Email Still Top the List of Most Popular Online Activities, PEW RESEARCH 
CTR. (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.pewinternet.org/2011/08/09/search-and-email-still-top-the-list-of-
most-popular-online-activities/ [https://perma.cc/MWS5-G5G6]. 
 203. BLUEHORNET, BLUEHORNET REPORT: 2014 CONSUMER VIEWS OF EMAIL MARKETING 5 
(2015), http://www.bluehornet.com/wp-content/uploads/2014-BH-Consumer-Views-Report_02.pdf. 
 204. Id. 
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messaging in 2007, that number had grown to 80 percent by 2012.
205
 
Messaging apps such as WhatsApp, SnapChat, and Livetext offer other 
platforms through which individuals can communicate quickly and 
easily.
206
 Even employees who work at distant facilities can now engage in 
virtually face-to-face conversations through videochat platforms such as 
Skype, FaceTime, and ooVoo.
207
  
Perhaps even more importantly, social media has become ubiquitous in 
recent years. Johnson provided many statistics showing this growth and 
the massive presence established by social media sites.
208
 Additionally, the 
Pew Research Center issued a new report in 2015 detailing the growth of 
social media since 2005.
209
 This report shows that, while only 7 percent of 
American adults used social media in 2005, 65 percent did so in 2015.
210
 
Furthermore, social media usage will almost certainly continue trending 
upwards amongst the working population due to major differences 
between demographic groups. The proportion of Americans between the 
ages of 18 and 29 who used social media in 2015 was 90 percent, while 77 
percent of those between 30 and 49 did so.
211
 However, those who are 
currently aged 50–64, and will thus soon reach retirement age, only used 
social media at a rate of 51 percent in 2015.
212
  
 
 
 205. Maeve Duggan & Lee Rainie, Cell Phone Activities 2012, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 25, 
2012), http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/11/25/cell-phone-activities-2012/ [https://perma.cc/AJ45-RJ89]. 
 206. The Pew Research Center reports that 36 percent of smartphone users utilized such apps as of 
April 2015. Messaging Apps Appeal to Smartphone Owners, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 17, 2015), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/08/19/mobile-messaging-and-social-media-2015/2015-08-19_social-
media-update_01/ [https://perma.cc/D2J6-HUPB]. This study also reported a feature of such apps that 
should be particularly interesting to employees concerned that their employers will discover their 
protected activities:  17 percent of smartphone users use apps that delete messages upon reading. Id.  
 207. The Pew Research Center reported in 2010 that 19 percent of Americans had video chatted. 
Lee Rainie & Kathryn Zickuhr, Video Calling and Video Chat, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 13, 2010), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2010/10/13/video-calling-and-video-chat/ [https://perma.cc/632N-L899]. 
Since that time, video chat providers have continued to grow. Skype, for example, set a record (based 
on numbers publicly viewable in its application) in 2011 by having 27 million users online 
simultaneously. Vlad Savov, Skype Hits New Record of 27 Million Simultaneous Users in Wake of iOS 
Video Chat Release, ENGADGET (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.engadget.com/2011/01/11/skype-hits-
new-record-of-27-million-simultaneous-users-in-wake-o/ [https://perma.cc/6F23-B38L]. That record 
had grown to 50 million by 2013. Jean Mercier, 50 Million Concurrent Users Online!, SKYPE 
NUMEROLOGY (Jan. 21, 2013, 8:19 PM), http://skypenumerology.blogspot.se/2013/01/50-million-
concurrent-users-online.html [https://perma.cc/G49P-FP2U].  
 208. See supra notes 173–80 and accompanying text. 
 209. Andrew Perrin, Social Media Usage: 2005–2015, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 8, 2015), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/08/social-networking-usage-2005-2015/ [https://perma.cc/QH35-
XHP7]. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. To the extent that many individuals over age 65 continue to work, it is noteworthy that 
only 35% of that age group’s members used social media in 2015. Id. 
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Social media platforms also provide many features that are useful for 
organizing purposes, which email systems simply cannot match.
213
 A 
video of a union rally, for example, could be both posted on Facebook and 
sent to coworkers via email. The video sent via email may be deleted 
immediately. However, the video posted on Facebook will appear on the 
employee’s News Feed, even if the employee has logged onto Facebook 
for reasons completely unrelated to work. In fact, if the employee’s “auto-
play” feature is enabled (per Facebook’s default settings), the video will 
begin playing (without audio), even if the employee has not clicked on 
it.
214
 
Furthermore, smartphone utilization has also grown significantly in 
recent years.
215
 The proportion of American adults who own smartphones 
reached 64 percent in 2015, a major increase from the 35 percent who did 
so in 2011.
216
 Similar to social media, those who have the longest 
remaining careers ahead of them are the most likely to own a 
smartphone.
217
 Smartphones now permeate virtually all aspects of society, 
with many Americans using them for purposes such as finding medical 
information, banking, reviewing real estate listings, job searches, pursuing 
government services, and education.
218
 In fact, many employers now 
actually require that employees have their personal smartphones at work 
through “Bring Your Own Device” policies.219  
Smartphones are especially important because they provide a sort of 
multiplier effect to the importance of other forms of electronic 
communication by allowing all of them to be used anywhere the owner 
goes. Smartphones are used to send and receive personal email by 82.4 
 
 
 213. See, e.g., 10 Features That Made Facebook the Most Used Social Media Site, VENTURE 
CAPITAL POST (Sept. 25, 2014, 11:29 PM), http://www.vcpost.com/articles/27824/20140925/10-
features-made-facebook-used-social-media-site.htm [https://perma.cc/P93Z-UNYM]. 
 214. See I See Videos Playing Silently When I Scroll Through News Feed. How Does This Work 
with My Mobile Data Plan?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/633446180035470 
[https://perma.cc/7Y49-BEQD].  
 215. See AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR., U.S. SMARTPHONE USE IN 2015 (2015), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in-2015/ [https://perma.cc/RS9T-PFBC]. 
 216. Id. at 2. 
 217. Americans aged 18–29 own smartphones at a rate of 85%, and 79% of those aged 30–49 do 
so. Meanwhile, only 54% of Americans aged 50–64 own them, and only 27% of those over age 65 use 
smartphones. Id. at 13. 
 218. Id. at 5. 
 219. Melinda L. McLellan et al., Wherever You Go, There You Are (With Your Mobile Device): 
Privacy Risks and Legal Complexities Associated with International “Bring Your Own Device” 
Programs, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2014); Raphael Rajendra, Employee-Owned Devices, Social 
Media, and the NLRA, 30 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 47 (2014). 
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percent of their owners, to send and receive texts by 90.6 percent, and to 
participate in social media by 66.6 percent.
220
  
All of these developments show that communication through means 
other than business email has changed significantly since 2007. Changes 
of this magnitude lend a great deal of credence to Johnson’s assertion that 
the “turf” of employer-owned email systems “has grown even more 
nonessential to Section 7 rights.”221 
V. THE RELEVANCE OF ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF COMMUNICATION 
The Purple Communications majority, while acknowledging that it 
engaged in a balancing of employees’ Section 7 rights with employers’ 
property rights,
222
 also asserted that alternative means of communication 
are irrelevant to that analysis.
223
 Instead, the majority accused the Register 
Guard Board and the Purple Communications dissent of applying a 
reasonable alternative means analysis that is only appropriate for non-
employee access.
224
 The majority’s support for this proposition appears 
suspect when the Supreme Court cases that it relied upon are examined 
more closely. Johnson offered two reasons to reject the majority’s refusal 
to consider alternative means of communication.
225
  
First, he argued that Justice Brennan’s statement in Beth Israel had “no 
bearing on the argument here” because it pertained to face-to-face 
interactions in physical space.
226
 Johnson may have overreached in this 
characterization of Supreme Court precedent. This history must, as a 
matter of stare decisis and judicial hierarchy, have at least some bearing 
on the Board’s decision-making, even in cases involving novel issues.227 
However, Johnson’s overall point that this issue requires a fresh look at 
the balance of interests does appear to be sensible due to the rapidly 
evolving nature of electronic communications.
228
 
 
 
 220. See supra note 203, at 21. 
 221. Purple Commc’ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, at 61 (2014) (Johnson, Member, dissenting). 
 222. Id. at 14 (concluding that the framework adopted is “consistent with . . . our obligation to 
accommodate the competing rights of employers and employees”). 
 223. See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text. 
 224. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 225. See supra notes 186–91 and accompanying text. 
 226. Purple Communications, at 53 (Johnson, Member, dissenting). 
 227. Furthermore, the Board has successfully applied traditional approaches to the electronic 
world in other contexts. See, e.g., Three D, LLC, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 31 (Aug. 22, 2014); Hispanics 
United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (Dec. 14, 2012). (applying traditional analytical 
framework for retaliation to cases involving protected activities on social media).  
 228. The Board has not hesitated to re-engage in this balance of interests regarding other topics, 
such as off-duty and off-site employee access. See Tri-County Med. Ctr., 222 N.L.R.B. 1089 (1976) 
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Johnson’s second response, that existing Supreme Court precedent 
does not rule out consideration of alternative means of engaging in Section 
7 activities, is an even stronger argument. The Supreme Court has never 
held that alternative means of engaging in protected activities are 
irrelevant to the balance of employers’ and employees’ interests. Most 
notably, Justice Brennan’s statement that “alternative means of 
communication is not, with respect to employee organizational activity, a 
necessary inquiry”229 is not the same as holding that it is an improper 
inquiry.  
Additionally, Justice Brennan’s statement relied upon the comment by 
the Supreme Court in Babcock & Wilcox that “[n]o restriction may be 
placed on the employees’ right to discuss self-organization among 
themselves.”230 However, Babcock & Wilcox pertained to non-employee 
access, and this statement only illustrated the importance of the distinction 
between employees and non-employees.
231
 Thus, the relied-upon statement 
was dictum. Furthermore, this statement in Babcock & Wilcox relied upon 
a portion of Republic Aviation that merely expressed the Court’s approval 
of the Board’s balancing of interests, arriving at the “working time is for 
work” maxim of Peyton Packing.232 
Finally, the manner in which the Supreme Court has analyzed cases 
shows that alternative means do matter. Beth Israel itself, for example, 
considered the inadequacy of employee locker rooms for protected 
activities in upholding the right to engage in those activities in the 
cafeteria.
233
 Babcock & Wilcox proclaimed, in a statement necessary to its 
holding, that the balancing of interests requires “as little destruction of one 
as is consistent with the maintenance of the other.”234 The extent to which 
one interest is destroyed, and another maintained, necessarily implicates 
the alternative means of maintaining each party’s interest. Likewise, the 
Supreme Court approved the Board’s reliance on the absence of other 
means to engage in protected activities in Republic Aviation.
235
 These 
 
 
(balancing interests in test for off-duty employee access); First Healthcare Corp. (Hillhaven Highland 
House), 336 N.L.R.B. 646, 648 (2001) (balancing interests in rationale regarding off-site employee 
access). 
 229. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 505 (1978) (emphasis added). 
 230. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956). 
 231. See id. 
 232. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). 
 233. Beth Israel, 437 U.S. at 489–90.  
 234. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 112. 
 235. 324 U.S. at 803 n.10.  
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examples provide significant support for the dissenting members’ 
positions that alternative means should be considered.
236
 
However, even putting Johnson’s arguments aside, it is nonsensical to 
suggest that competing interests can be weighed without consideration of 
the alternatives. Both employees’ Section 7 rights and employers’ property 
rights must, in some manner, be assessed a value in the decision-maker’s 
mind in order to be compared to one another. It is impossible to assign a 
value to anything without reference to its alternatives. In fact, the 
consideration of alternatives constitutes the fundamental concept of 
“opportunity cost,” a basic principle of economic theory.237 Furthermore, 
any item’s value is based primarily on other buying opportunities available 
to its buyers (supply), and other selling opportunities available to its 
sellers (demand).
238
 These principles apply not only to the economic 
realm, but also to all decision-making processes.
239
 As a result, in order to 
weigh employees’ Section 7 rights against employers’ property rights, 
consideration of employees’ other means to engage in protected activities 
is both logical and necessary. 
The majority’s refusal to consider other forms of electronic 
communications in Purple Communications thus stands in stark contrast to 
the vehement complaints of the Register Guard dissent,
240
 unions,
241
 and 
pro-labor academics
242
 that Register Guard demonstrated a failure to adapt 
to changing circumstances. The justifications that the Board offered for 
minimizing the importance of other forms of electronic communication 
further highlighted this contrast because its reasoning ignored some of the 
essential capabilities of these tools.  
The majority’s emphasis on the ability to engage in protected activities 
in the workplace seems to suggest that media such as personal email and 
social media cannot be accessed at work.
243
 However, employees can log 
 
 
 236. It should also be noted that other cases cited by the majority in support of its position, Eastex, 
Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978) and NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., 442 U.S. 773 (1979), both asked the 
Supreme Court to draw lines between working and nonworking areas in particular industries. As 
Member Johnson explained, this exercise “inherently incorporates a consideration of alternative means 
of communication (e.g. distribution in nonwork areas only versus distribution throughout premises).” 
Purple Commc’ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, at 54 (Dec. 11, 2014) (Johnson, Member, dissenting). 
 237. PAUL KRUGMAN & ROBIN WELLS, MICROECONOMICS 7–8 (2d ed. 2009). 
 238. Id. at 79–82. 
 239. See, e.g., EUGENE BARDACH, A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS: THE EIGHTFOLD 
PATH TO MORE EFFECTIVE PROBLEM SOLVING 15–25 (2d ed. 2005) (describing the importance of 
alternative options to effective policymaking processes). 
 240. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 241. See supra notes 104–05. 
 242. See supra notes 106–08. 
 243. See supra notes 136–38 and accompanying text. 
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on to these accounts without using a business email system and, more and 
more commonly, can do so on their own smartphones.
244
 Likewise, as 
Johnson pointed out, the Board’s assertion that employees might be 
“virtual strangers”245 with one another ignores the significant search 
capabilities offered by social media websites and common search 
engines.
246
 
The majority concluded its opinion in Purple Communications by 
declaring: 
The Register Guard dissenters viewed the decision as confirming 
that the Board was “the Rip Van Winkle of administrative 
agencies,” by “fail[ing] to recognize that e-mail ha[d] 
revolutionized communication both within and outside the 
workplace” and by unreasonably contending “that an e-mail 
system is a piece of communications equipment to be treated 
just as the law treats bulletin boards, telephones, and pieces of 
scrap paper.” . . . In overruling Register Guard, we seek to make 
“[n]ational labor policy . . . responsive to the enormous 
technological changes that are taking place in our society.”247 
However, the development of other forms of electronic communications in 
the interim means that the majority’s rationale, which would have been far 
more convincing in 2007, is not reflective of more recent circumstances. 
As a result, in its attempt to stay modern and relevant, the Board got its 
wires crossed and actually failed to adjust to changes in circumstances 
between 2007 and December 2014.
248
  
 
 
 244. See supra notes 214–19 and accompanying text. 
 245. See supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text. 
 246. See supra notes 182–83 and accompanying text. 
 247. Purple Commc’ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, at 17 (Dec. 11, 2014) (quoting Register 
Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1121 (2007)). 
 248. This Note expresses no opinion regarding whether the Board’s 2007 Register Guard decision 
was correct given the circumstances of the time. Register Guard dissenting Members Liebman and 
Walsh may well have been correct in their argument that access to employer-owned email was 
necessary because it offered characteristics that, at the time, were “unique” and “sophisticated.” 
Register Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1125. On the other hand, the Register Guard majority may have 
correctly concluded that “e-mail has not changed the pattern of industrial life . . . to the extent that . . . 
employee use of [employers’] e-mail system[s] for Section 7 purposes must . . . be mandated.” Id. at 
1116. Regardless of which perspective better reflected the realities of the workplace in 2007, this Note 
argues only that the growth of personal electronic communications between 2007 and 2014 tipped the 
scales much further towards protection of property rights. 
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CONCLUSION 
Future developments in this area, including possible reversal of Purple 
Communications, will depend on the views of the federal courts and the 
political composition of the Board. Any such reversal would likely cite the 
evolving role of technology in the personal and work lives of Americans. 
Reliance on trends such as extensive use of personal email, text 
messaging, video chatting, social media, and smartphones would be 
justified based on recent societal developments. For now, the Board’s 
refusal to consider major recent technological changes stands, and 
represents a failed attempt to show adaptability. 
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